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I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code' (the Code) serves a dis-
tributive function; it is designed to distribute equitably a debtor's
assets from the bankruptcy estate to creditors. All nonexempt as-
sets owned by a debtor at the time of filing a petition for bank-
ruptcy become part of the bankruptcy estate and subsequently are
distributed to creditors.2 Generally, debtor transactions prior to
the filing escape the purview of Chapter 7. If, howeve, a debtor
distributes assets during the applicable statutory period, giving
preference to some creditors' or defrauding other creditors,' the
Code empowers the bankruptcy trustee to avoid those transfers.
After filing, a debtor may redeem certain types of property placed
under a creditor's lien by paying the creditor's claim. 5 Selected
provisions within Chapter 7 describe these basic elements of liqui-
dation that require a valuation of debtor assets. Each provision
mentioned may require a valuation under presently vague statu-
tory language, sparse legislative history, and conflicting judicial
interpretations.
This Note explores, on an individual basis, certain Bankruptcy
Code sections requiring valuation in a bankruptcy liquidation situ-
ation. Part II of this Note examines section 522, which exempts
certain debtor assets from bankruptcy, but only to a limited value
amount. Although section 522 states that "value" means "fair mar-
ket value,"6 some courts, because of the liquidation context of sec-
tion 522, have used the lower "liquidation value" as the applicable
standard.7 Part III discusses section 547, which allows the trustee
to avoid preferential transfers to creditors, provided that the
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-09; 301-350; 501-559; 701-766 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 33.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982) (exemption provision); see infra note 16 (listing
exemptions).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982) (preferential transfers); see infra note 68 (quoting text of §
547).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982) (fraudulent transfers); see infra note 168 (quoting text of §
548).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1982) (redemption provision); see infra note 246 (quoting text of §
722).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982).
7. See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
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debtor was insolvent and the transfer enabled the creditor to re-
ceive a greater amount than would have been received proceeding
only on the creditor's secured claim.8 The valuation of assets to
determine solvency has enjoyed numerous, but inconsistent, judi-
cial interpretations; valuation to determine the amount of a se-
cured claim is a more recently evolving issue. Part IV explores sec-
tion 548, which permits a trustee to avoid certain transfers by a
debtor, including involuntary foreclosure sales of the debtor's
property, if the debtor does not receive a "reasonably equivalent
value" as consideration for the property.9 Courts are divided
sharply over whether "reasonable equivalence" is measured by fair
market value or by foreclosure market value. Part V discusses sec-
tion 722, which allows a debtor to redeem certain property placed
under a creditor's lien for the amount of lien, generally measured
by the value of the property."° Courts have valued encumbered
property anywhere from a full fair market value to a lower whole-
sale or liquidation value. Part VI summarizes the different valua-
tion methods used for each Code section discussed and suggests an
appropriate standard that Congress should adopt for each section.
For each Code section discussed, this Note first describes how
the mechanics of each section align debtors and creditors in advo-
cating certain methods of valuation. Next, this Note examines ju-
dicial responses to each section, emphasizing conflicting theoretical
approaches and policies. Finally, this Note suggests valuation stan-
dards that will enhance predictability and uniformity within each
of the Code sections discussed.
II. SECTION 522 EXEMPTION VALUE
A. Mechanics Underlying the Valuation Issue
Section 52211 of the Code grants debtors the right to exempt
portions of certain property from the reach of creditors. 12 Congress
has described the purpose behind exemption relief as giving debt-
ors a "fresh start" after bankruptcy by ensuring that debtors re-
8. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
9. Id. § 548.
10. Id. § 722.
11. Id. § 522.
12. See Haines, Security Interests in Exempt Personalty: Toward Safeguarding Basic
Exempt Necessities, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 215 (1981); Reed, Over the Hill to the Poor
House-The Failure of Section 522 Bankruptcy Exemptions Under the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978, 61 DEN. U.L. REv. 705 (1984); Note, The Preemption of Bank-
ruptcy-Only Exemptions, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 583 (1985).
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tain the basic necessities of life.'3 The exemption provision repre-
sents an attempt to strike an appropriate balance between debtor
survival and creditor rights. 14 The theoretical basis for exemption
is that certain debtor necessities outweigh the debtor's obligation
to satisfy fully an outstanding debt.' 5
The Code specifically identifies each exemption available and
places a dollar amount limitation on each type of asset exempted.'1
Because the dollar amounts for each exemption are limited, a
debtor will argue for a valuation low enough to absorb completely
a given asset by the exemption amount, or at least low enough to
limit the amount of exposure to creditors. For example, section 522
allows an exemption of $1,200 for a debtor's motor vehicle. 17 To
protect fully the vehicle by the exemption amount, a debtor will
argue that the car's value is equal to or less than $1,200. A creditor
can access the car only to the extent that its value exceeds $1,200
and, consequently, will argue for a much higher value for the car.
Debtors and creditors argue not only over dollar amounts, but
also over the appropriate standard for determining how an asset
should be valued. Many of the Code sections that give rise to a
valuation issue require or allow an incorporation of section 506(a),
which identifies a valuation system providing guidance in applying
the appropriate standard of valuation.' Section 506(a) calls for a
valuation within the broad guidelines of (1) the purpose of the val-
13. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6087-88.
14. Sce Haines, supra note 12, at 217.
15. See id. at 216.
16. Section (d) lists the exemptable items and amounts: (1) debtor's residence, $7,500;
(2) motor vehicle, $1,200; (3) household furnishings, $200 per item, $4,000 aggregate; (4)
jewelry, $500; (5) debtor's interest in any property, $400, plus up to $3,700 of any unused
amount from paragraph (1); (6) tools of trade, $750; (7) any unmatured life insurance con-
tract owned by the debtor, other than a credit life insurance contract; (8) accrued interest,
dividends, or loan value of insurance, $4,000; (9) prescribed health aids; (10) rights to re-
ceive social security, unemployment compensation, public assistance; veterans' benefits; dis-
ability, illness, or unemployment benefits; alimony, support, or separate maintenance; cer-
tain stock bonus and profitsharing plans; (11) certain rights to compensation. 11 U.S.C. §
522(d) (1982).
17. Id. § 522(d)(2) (stating that "[t]he following property may be exempted under sub-
section (b)(1) of this section: . . . (2) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,200 in value, in
one motor vehicle").
18. Section 506(a) values collateral to determine the extent to which a claim is se-
cured. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). This Note examines other sections that trigger the use of
Section 506(a) valuation. See infra notes 115-62, 246-301 and accompanying text (noting




uation, and (2) the proposed use or disposition of the property. 19
Section 522, however, apparently rejects the section 506(a) system
and independently defines the word "value."2 Section 522 offers
the seemingly clear statement that "value" means "fair market
value as of the date of the filing of the petition." 2' Therefore, the
section 522 provision attempts to set forth a much more objective
definition than section 506(a).
Courts, however, have offered varied interpretations of the
section 522 term "fair market value." Courts have failed to develop
a constant or uniform standard because the term "fair market
value" merely begs the question of which market is to be used in a
valuation determination. Commercial transactions occur in many
different types of markets. Liquidation value and ordinary fair
market value, for example, connote two very different values for
the same item. In the context of section 522, the lower "liquidation
value" aids a debtor's fresh start; the higher "ordinary fair market
value" may allow a creditor to recoup more of the outstanding debt
balance. Arguments supporting each of these two positions are
presented below and are followed by a critique suggesting that be-
cause "liquidation value" better serves the policy of section 522,
Congress should adopt a standard that permits recognition of the
liquidation market as the appropriate market for determining "fair
market value."
B. Opposing Judicial Responses
1. Walsh: Section 522 "Fair Market Value" Means Fair
Liquidation Market Value
In 1980 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Columbia, in In re Walsh,2" held that because section 522 func-
tions to determine how much property ultimately is subject to a
Chapter 7 liquidation, the "fair market value" contemplated by
that section must be equivalent to "liquidation value. '2 3 The
Walsh court approached the issue of interpreting fair market value
as a statutory construction problem. 24 Initially, the court recog-
nized that section 522 defines value only for section 522 purposes;
19. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). See infra note 147 for the text and legislative history of
section 506(a).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (1982).
21. Id.
22. 5 Bankr. 239 (Bankr. D.C. 1980).
23. Id. at 241.
24. Id. at 240.
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the language specifically states that "[i]n this section value means
fair market value. ' 25 The court, therefore, did not look elsewhere
in the Code for interpretive guidance. Furthermore, the court
found no relevant legislative history regarding section 522.26 The
court noted that although clear statutory language requires a
"plain meaning" interpretation, a statute should be interpreted in
a manner that is consistent with all of its provisions and goals.
2
7
The court then set forth the ordinary meaning of "fair market
value" as the "price at which a willing seller and a willing buyer
will trade. s28 After stating this normally accepted definition, how-
ever, the court found support for the proposition that the defini-
tion may "var[y] with the circumstances surrounding a given ob-
ject and situation to which it is sought to apply. '29 Furthermore,
the Walsh court noted that a valuation must have a practical pur-
pose in harmony with its context.30
This "contextual approach" to interpreting the term "fair
market value" was the focus of the court's opinion. To explain how
the context of the section 522 exemption leads to a "liquidation
value" interpretation of the "fair market value" language in the
Code, the court offered the following hypothetical: 1 A debtor owns
25. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
26. 5 Bankr. at 240; see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 360, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6316; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 75,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5861.
27. 5 Bankr. at 240-41.
28. Id. at 241.
29. Id. (quoting McDougall Co. v. Atkins, 201 Tenn. 589, 301 S.W.2d 335, 337 (1957)
(holding valuation of air ducts installed in buildings for sales tax purposes not equivalent to
scrap value)).
30. The court stated: "The definition is 'not invariable,' but 'varies with the circum-
stances surrounding the given object and situation to which it is sought to apply to the
term.' A valuation is always a stage in some proceeding which has a practical purpose. Thus,
the Courts have viewed fair market value in the context in which the valuation question has
arisen." 5 Bankr. at 241 (citations omitted); see MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES, § 43, 44
at 163-67 (1935).
31. The hypothetical is illustrated as follows:
A debtor owns an automobile, free and clear of any lien, which, if sold under ordinary
market conditions-the willing buyer and willing seller approach to the fair market
value-would yield $2,000. The debtor, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(2), claims the
auto as exempt to the extent of $1,200. If the Court deems the asset to be worth $2,000
because of a theoretical fair market value standard and authorizes a sale by the Trus-
tee, the resulting sale, of necessity, in the actual forced sale setting, may bring only
$1,200-the amount which the debtor is entitled to claim as exempt. Obviously, in this
situation, no benefit to the estate is gained because the only amount realized is subject
to the debtor's claim of exemption. Accordingly, the only conclusion that can be logi-
cally drawn is that fair market value, as defined in 522(a), is subject to bankruptcy
market conditions.
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an automobile that could bring a price of $2,000 under ordinary
market conditions. Pursuant to section 522(d)(2), the debtor
claims the automobile to be exempt to the extent of $1,200. If the
court chooses to value the automobile at a "theoretical fair market
value" standard and authorizes a sale by the trustee under forced
liquidation-type procedures, that sale may bring only $1,200-the
debtor's exemption amount. Thus, the estate does not benefit be-
cause the full proceeds of the actual sale would fall within the
debtor's exempt amount.
Although the Walsh court exhibits a well developed and logi-
cal analysis in interpreting the section 522 "fair market value"
standard, the majority of courts have held that "fair market value"
under section 522 contemplates the more traditional market in
which a willing buyer and a willing seller would. trade. 2 Even
though many other jurisdictions do not accept Walsh, a recent de-
cision, In re Ricks, 3 indicates that Walsh remains the applicable
law in the District of Columbia. The Ricks court, however, was not
forced to confront facts that would cause the method of valuation
to be outcome determinative because the property would have
been fully exempt even if valued at ordinary fair market value.3
The court did note that the value could have been determined by
liquidation value pursuant to Walsh. 5
2. Nellis: Section 522 "Fair Market Value" Means Traditional
Fair Market Value
Shortly after the Walsh opinion the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Connecticut, in In re Nellis,3 6 carefully
considered the Walsh holding, but decided that "liquidation
value" does not satisfy the section 522 fair market value require-
ment.317 Although the Nellis court used the same statutory con-
struction analysis as the Walsh court, the Nellis court found that
Congress clearly had precluded the use of liquidation value when it
5 Bankr. at 241 n.3.
32. See, e.g., In re Moore, 30 Bankr. 197 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983); In re Parenteau, 23
Bankr. 289 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982); In re Henderson, 33 Bankr. 1419 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1982);
In re Holyst, 19 Bankr. 14 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982); In re Shuttleworth, 12 Bankr. 27 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1981); In re Nellis, 12 Bankr. 770 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982). But see In re Ricks, 40
Bankr. 507 (Bankr. D.C. 1984) (following the Walsh view).
33. In re Ricks, 40 Bankr. 507, 509 (Bankr. D.C. 1984).
34. Id. at 509.
35. Id.
36. 12 Bankr. 770 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
37. Id. at 772.
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defined section 522 value as "fair market value. '3'8 The Nellis court
analogized from section 101(26) of the Code, which uses the phrase
"at a fair valuation" to describe the value of an insolvent's prop-
erty.39 The court rested its conclusion solely on Professor Collier's
interpretation of section 101(26), which describes the appropriate
market as that between willing buyers and sellers under ordinary
conditions.40
Since the Nellis decision, most bankruptcy courts have fol-
lowed its "ordinary market" approach rather than Walsh's "liqui-
dation market" approach.41 At least one court has noted that valu-
ation under section 506(a) is much more flexible than a section 522
valuation because section 506(a) asks for an examination of the cir-
cumstances, whereas section 522 does not.42 Some post-Nellis deci-
sions, including a recent opinion by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, simply have stated, without analysis
or justification, that "fair market value" contemplates the ordinary
market place value negotiated between willing buyers and sellers.43
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The court stated:
In § 101(26) of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress, in defining "insolvent" uses the phrase
"at a fair evaluation" to determine the amount of an entity's property. 2 Collier on
Bankruptcy (15th ed.) 101.26[4] in discussing "fair valuation" claims that such valua-
tion is not arrived at "by reliance upon the sum which would be realized at a foreclo-
sure, execution or receivership sale . . . nor . . . the price which the debtor could ob-
tain if he were forced to instantly dispose of the assets in question" (emphasis in
original at 101-55). Fair valuation is "what can be realized out of the assets within a
reasonable time either through collection or sale at the regular market value, conceiv-
ing the latter as the amount which could be obtained for the property in question
within such period by a 'capable and diligent businessman' from an interested buyer
'who is willing to purchase under the ordinary selling conditions.'"
12 Bankr. at 772 (citation omitted).
41. See, e.g., In re Parenteau, 23 Bankr. 289 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982); In re Moore, 30
Bankr. 197 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983); In re Holyst, 19 Bankr. 14 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982); In re
Henderson, 33 Bankr. 149 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1982); In re Shuttleworth, 12 Bankr. 27 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1981). But see In re Ricks, 40 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. D.C. 1984).
42. In re Henderson, 33 Bankr. 149, 150 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1982). The Henderson court
examined both Walsh and Nellis and decided to follow Nellis' ordinary fair market value
approach. Later, the court makes a classic error, concluding that the standard for appraisal
should be fair market value. The term fair market value, however, is exactly how section 522
defines value, and that definition is exactly what Walsh interpreted to mean fair "liquida-
tion market value." Courts should be more careful with terminology; the Henderson court
should have concluded by stating which "market" it thought Congress intended to refer to
when it used the phrase "fair market value." For this reason, the Walsh court offered sound
analysis because it endeavored to determine the appropriate "market" intended by the
phrase "fair market value."
43. See In re Fitzgerald, 729 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Rehbein, 49 Bankr. 250
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); In re Allen, 44 Bankr. 38 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1984); In re Rappaport,
184
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In further support of this view, even pre-Code bankruptcy exemp-
tion cases valued the exempt property with a standard in accord
with the Nellis approach.44
The next question confronted under the Nellis approach is
how to value property at the fair market value standard. Thus far,
the analysis only has attached a label to the appropriate standard.
In applying that standard to procure the correct result, many
courts do not get beyond mere generalities.45 One court has stated
affirmatively, however, that "[a]n appraisal of a property is not the
result of a scientific analysis. ' 48 Another court has recognized the
subjective nature of "value" and, consequently, has suggested that
a court should not become fixed on a particular figure, but should
take guidance from all factors.47 Despite the vagueness surround-
ing the "value" concept, certain guidelines established by the
courts in section 522 proceedings merit attention. Generally, ap-
praisals of a property's selling price are determined "exclusive of
reductions for expenses or costs which might be incurred in [that
theoretical] sale."'48 Appraisals often are the only criteria on which
19 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
44. In re Aranoff & Son, 1 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1931).
45. See In re Moore, 30 Bankr. 197 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983). One Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel, however, has articulated guidelines for interpreting "ordinary fair market value." See
In re Parenteau, 23 Bankr. 289 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982) (citing Nellis with approval). The
Moore court stated:
Fair market value has been defined as: 1. The highest price in terms of money which a
property will bring in a competitive and open market under the conditions requisite to
a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeably, and assuming
the price is not affected by undue stimulus. 2. The price at which a willing seller would
sell and a willing buyer would buy, neither being under abnormal pressure. 3. The price
expectable if a reasonable time is allowed to find a purchaser and if both seller and
prospective buyer are fully informed. . . . AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE AP-
PRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 23 (7th Ed. 1978). Implicit in this definition
is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date in the passing whereby: 1. Buyer
and seller are typically motivated. 2. Both parties are well informed, are well advised,
and each acting in what he considers his own best interest. 3. A reasonable time is
allowed for exposure in the open market. 4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.
5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the community at the specified
date and typical for the property type in its locale. 6. The price represents a normal
consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or
terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.
30 Bankr. at 198-99 (citing AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL
OF REAL ESTATE 23 (7th ed. 1978)).
46. In re Development, Inc., 36 Bankr. 998, 1004 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984).
47. In re Rehbein; 49 Bankr. 250, 253 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
48. Id.; see also In re Nellis, 12 Bankr. 770, 773 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). At least one
court has held that fair market value does not include hypothetical broker fees, even if
clearly ascertainable. In re Shuttleworth, 12 Bankr. 27, 29 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981).
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courts base their conclusions. Courts closely scrutinize the merits
and foundations of appraisals offered by the parties.49 When actual
sales of other property are used to reflect the hypothetical sale
price of the property in question, courts examine both the compa-
rability of the property sold and the date of the sale.50 Section 522
sets a clear time for the valuation: "as of the date of the filing of
the peititon. ' ' 51 Postpetition appreciation, therefore, inures to the
benefit of the debtor,52 thereby supporting the policy of encourag-
ing a debtor's postbankruptcy efforts to recover and start afresh.
5 3
After the filing date, however, if the debtor consummates a sale for
greater than the declared value at the time of filing, and the court
finds no proof that the property has changed in value since the
filing, the court will adopt the sale price as the proper value of the
property.54
C. Analysis: Value Resulting from an Actual Sale
The essential dispute between Walsh and Nellis adherents fo-
cuses on whether Congress made a "clear expression '55 when it de-
fined "value" under section 522 as "fair market value. 5 Neither
the Code language nor its legislative history reveals a clear con-
gressional intent.5 7 Indeed, the deeper question is whether Con-
gress had a specific intent at all when it defined value. Congress
likely contemplated the common usage of the term "fair market
value" without considering that a different fair value may exist
under different markets. Opposing interpretations of "fair market
value" emerged, therefore, because a literal interpretation of the
term "fair market value" leaves open the question of which market
is to be considered. Section 522 itself does not stipulate which
"market" is contemplated. The Walsh court resorted to a valua-
tion method similar to that prescribed under section 506(a): the
court looked to the circumstances and context of the valuation. 8
The court recognized that "[t]he only market on the day a bank-
49. See, e.g., In re Rappaport, 19 Bankr. 971, 973 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
50. See id.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (1982).
52. In re Rappaport, 19 Bankr. 971, 973 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., In re Fitzgerald, 729 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1984).
55. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
58. 5 Bankr. at 240-41.
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ruptcy petition is filed, is, invariably a bankruptcy sale. '59 This
concept supports the adoption of "liquidation value." The Walsh
court, however, wisely did not rely on or mention section 506(a)
and, consequently, perhaps saved itself from attack under a statu-
tory construction argument.
Congress drafted section 506(a) to identify the extent to which
a claim is secured, an analysis that requires a valuation of the col-
lateral.6 0 Many sections require the bifurcation of claims into se-
cured and unsecured portions and incorporate section 506(a) for
guidance in valuing the collateral." Congress seemingly was aware
that section 506(a) would be used in both a liquidation and reor-
ganization context and, accordingly, drafted broad guidelines
aimed at the context of the valuation.6 2 Although section 522 gen-
erally does not govern secured claims, Congress could have di-
rected a section 522 inquiry to consult section 506(a) for guidance,
a directive that would have justified the Walsh result because of
the liquidation context of section 522. Instead, Congress drafted a
specific definition for section 522 and, therefore, likely intended
the ordinary meaning of "fair market value" to be determined in
the market between a willing buyer and seller. Congress, however,
likely did not intend the use of ordinary fair market value when a
market between a willing buyer and seller actually does not exist.
Congress should adopt the Walsh analysis and identify the
liquidation market, when the facts allow, as the proper market.
Congress should recognize that the Walsh view further supports
the policy of providing a postbankrupt debtor with the necessities
of life for two reasons. First, property valued under the lower liqui-
dation value is absorbed more easily by the exemptions' dollar lim-
itations. Second, property valued at ordinary fair market value
may produce, upon actual sale, only a liquidation value. For exam-
ple, under the hypothetical offered by the Walsh court,63 not only
did the estate fail to benefit-because the sale resulted in a de-
pressed liquidation value equaling the exemption amount-but the
debtor also lost an automobile that might have been a necessity.
Thus, the debtor would have been forced to purchase an auto for
$1,200 in the higher used car market to replace a $2,000 car. The
result is that the debtor gets a lower value car, the bankruptcy es-
59. Id. at 241.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
61. See, e.g., id. §§ 547, 722, 1125.
62. See infra note 147.
63. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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tate is not increased, and the estate even may have to pay the costs
of the sale.
The choice of valuation method, therefore, presents policy
questions perhaps not considered by Congress. Congress may have
intended, without express statement, ordinary fair market value to
be the standard; arguably, the exemption itself is a release from a
legal obligation and is a sufficient device to give debtors a fresh
start. The unfortunate, and perhaps unforeseen, result under the
ordinary fair market value approach, however, may be a sale that
deprives a debtor of a necessity and, instead of benefiting the
bankruptcy estate, burdens the estate with the cost of the sale. Ac-
cordingly, Congress should adopt a valuation standard for section
522 that will allow liquidation value when the facts do not suggest
that an actual sale would yield ordinary fair market value.
III. SECTION 547 PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS
A. Mechanics Underlying the Valuation Issue
Section 54764 of the Code allows the trustee, or in certain cir-
cumstances the debtor,6 5 to set aside, as "preferential," certain
transfers of,6 6 or liens upon,67 the debtor's property when these
transfers or liens occur during the statutory period. To set aside a
transfer as preferential, the debtor or trustee must prove that the
transfer was made (1) to benefit a creditor, (2) to satisfy a debt
existing prior to the transfer, (3) while the debtor was insolvent,
(4) on or within 90 days before the debtor filed a petition for bank-
ruptcy, and (5) to cause a creditor to receive an amount greater
than it would have received if it had waited to satisfy its claim
during a Chapter 7 liquidation. 8 Section 547's three principal pol-
64. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
65. Section 1107(a) gives a debtor in possession substantially the same rights as a
trustee:
Subject to any limitations on a trustee under this chapter and to such limitations or
conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have all the rights, other
than the right of compensation under section 330 of this title, and powers, and shall
perform all the functions and duties, except the duties specified in sections 1106(a)(2),
(3), and (4) of this title, of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.
11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1982); see In re Earth Servs., 25 Bankr. 399, 400 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982)
(holding debtor action to avoid the attachment of a judgment lien to be a preferential
transfer).
66. See In re Schick Oil & Gas, 35 Bankr. 282, 284 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (concern-
ing trustee action to avoid debtor's transfer of a security interest).
67. See Earth Servs., 25 Bankr. at 399.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982). Section 547(b) sets forth the following conditions re-
quired to classify a transfer as preferential:
[Vol. 40:177
1987] BANKRUPTCY VALUATION
icy objectives are (1) to discourage creditors from forcing debtors
to file petitions,69 (2) to prevent an unequal distribution of debtor
assets to similarly situated creditors, and (3) to lessen the creditor
scramble for an advantage on the eve of bankruptcy.70 Unequal
distribution, the real thrust behind section 547, occurs when a
creditor receives a greater amount than it would have received ab-
sent the transfer under a Chapter 7 liquidation. 71 Although a
claimant must prove each of the five elements listed above to avoid
a transfer,72 a valuation issue arises only under the third ("insol-
vency") and fifth ("greater amount received") requirements.
The "insolvency" requirement prompts a trustee or debtor
seeking to avoid a transfer to argue for a low total asset value, rela-
tive to total liabilities, in order to support a claim that the debtor
was insolvent at the time of the transfer." Conversely, the trans-
feree-creditor must argue for a high asset value in an effort to
prove that the debtor was solvent at the time of the transfer. The
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such trans-
fer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion, if such creditor, at the time of such transfer-
(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the
time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive
if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by
the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982).
69. See In re Thomas Farm Sys., Inc., 18 Bankr. 541, 542 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re
Vecco Const. Ind., 9 Bankr. 866, 867 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); Farmers Bank v. Julian, 383
F.2d. 314, 327 (8th Cir. 1967).
70. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6138-39; see Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir.
1981); see also Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38
VAND. L. REv. 713, 726 (1985).
71. See Barash, 658 F. 2d. at 507; see also infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
72. See Thomas Farm Sys., Inc., 18 Bankr. at 541.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (1982) defines insolvency as a condition where the debtor's
liabilities exceed his assets. In addition, the debtor is presumed to be insolvent during the
90 day period prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Id. § 547(f).
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"greater amount received" requirement demands the more difficult
determination of what the transferee-creditor would have received
under a Chapter 7 liquidation."4 Section 506(a) governs the extent
to which a creditor is secured and, thus, the amount available in
Chapter 7 liquidation. 75 For example, if the value of the collateral
exceeds the amount of the claim, it would be impossible for the
creditor to receive more from a transfer during the preference pe-
riod than the creditor would receive under liquidation because,
upon liquidation, the collateral would cover fully the creditor's
claim.76 The "greater amount received" issue, therefore, also moti-
vates debtors and trustees to prove a low value and creditors to
argue for a high, fully secured value.
Although the result of a singular vein of policy objectives,
77
section 547 nevertheless creates two separate valuation opportuni-
ties. Both the "insolvency" and the "greater amount received"
preference requirements lead to a valuation of debtor assets for the
same purpose, yet appear to operate through different statutory
mandates. Theoretically, these two requirements should use the
same valuation standard because both attempt to determine
whether a creditor is receiving preferential treatment from a
debtor on the eve of bankruptcy. Courts, however, have applied
different standards to the "insolvency" and the "greater amount
received" requirements. A discussion of how the courts have ap-
proached separately the valuation issue within each of these re-
quirements is presented below, followed by a brief section on
uniformity.
B. Section 547's "Insolvency" Requirement: "Fair Valuation"
in a Hypothetical Market
The two most common situations giving rise to the insolvency
issue are when a debtor attempts to avoid a judgment lien 78 and
when a trustee attempts to avoid a transfer made by a debtor to a
74. See infra notes 115-52 and accompanying text.
75. 11 U.S.C. §506(a) (1982). The creditor is secured only to the extent of the collat-
eral. To the extent money is available from the estate after the secured creditors are paid,
unsecured creditors receive payments on an equitable percentage basis. See In re Utility
Stationery Stores, Inc., 12 Bankr. 170, 179 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1981). For the pertinent text of
§ 506(a), see infra note 147.
76. See, e.g., In re Conn, 9 Bankr. 431, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981). If the collateral
value did not equal or exceed the amount of the claim, payments to the creditor above
collateral value would be preferential.
77. See Countryman, supra note 70, at 726.
78. See supra note 66.
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creditor.79 Although section 547 normally only reaches transfers
made 90 days before the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition, if
the transferee is an "insider," as defined in Code section 101(28),
the reach extends back to one year before the filing. These time
periods are termed the "preference periods."8 0
Recognizing that reasonable minds can differ on the valuation
issue, Congress placed a heavy burden on a transferee-creditor at-
tempting to prove that the debtor was solvent at the time of the
transfer. Section 547 contains a provision"l which states that "the
debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90
days immediately proceeding the date of the filing of the peti-
tion. '8 2 In valuation terms, this means that the value of debtor lia-
bilities is presumed to exceed debtor assets during the preference
period."' This presumption, however, provides little guidance on
the proper valuation standard for purposes of the insolvency
requirement.
Congress drafted the 90 day insolvency presumption to reduce
litigation and to promote equality because there was a perceived
rarity of debtor solvency during the preference period.8 4 Courts do
not hesitate to end quickly a case by applying this presumption
against a transferee that fails to come forward with evidence bear-
ing on the debtor's solvency. 5 Although the trustee or debtor car-
ries the overall burden of proof on the value issue, the creditor
must rebut the presumption of insolvency to avoid summary judg-
ment.8 6 Some courts, however, are lenient on the issue of how
much evidence a creditor must present to overcome the presump-
tion of insolvency.8 7 Once rebutted, however, the presumption ar-
79. See In re National Buy-Rite, Inc., 7 Bankr. 407 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1982); see supra note 68.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982) contains a similar provision.
82. The full text reads as follows: "(f) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is
presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date
of the filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1982).
83. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) (1982) (defining insolvency in the balance sheet sense).
84. See Countryman, supra note 70, at 727.
85. See Earth Servs., 25 Bankr. at 400. In Earth Servs. the court found that the pre-
sumption requires the party against whom it is directed to come forward with some evidence
to rebut the presumption, but the burden of proof remains on the party in whose favor the
presumption exists. In the instant case the defendant failed to introduce any testimony
bearing on insolvency, as defined in the Code, that would require the plaintiff to come for-
ward with rebutting evidence. Id.; see also Countryman, supra note 70, at 730 n.109 and
cases cited therein.
86. See In re National Buy-Rite, Inc., 7 Bankr. 407. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)
87. See Thomas Farm Sys., Inc., 18 Bankr. at 542 (holding letter from the debtor to
the creditor in which the debtor indicated doubts regarding its solvency sufficient to over-
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guably should not interfere with the valuation standards described
below.
Although the insolvency presumption may preempt some liti-
gation, the presumption remains a weak attempt to clarify the
standard by which property should be valued under section 547.
Section 101(29) of the Code defines insolvency as a "financial con-
dition such that the sum of [an entity's] debts is greater than all of
such entity's property, at a fair valuation.1s8 Based on the Code's
formal definition of insolvency, the properly phrased issue becomes
whether an entity's assets, at a "fair valuation," were less than the
entity's obligations at the time of the transfer." This comparison
of assets and liabilities commonly is termed the "balance sheet"
test.90
In a 1940 case that later would gain wide acceptance the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Syracuse
come the presumption).
88. Section 101(29) provides:
"insolvent" means-
(A) with reference to any entity other than a partnership, financial condition such
that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair
valuation, exclusive of-
(i) property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay or
defraud such entity's creditors; and
(ii) property that may be exempted from property of the estate under section
522 of this title; and
(B) with reference to a partnership, financial condition such that the sum of such
partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate of, at a fair valuation-
(i) all of such partnership's property, exclusive of property of the kind speci-
fied in subparagraph (A)(i) of this paragraph; and
(ii) the sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's nonpartner-
ship property, exclusive of property of the kind specified in subparagraph (a) of
this paragraph, over such partner's nonpartnership debts.
11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (1982). This definition is substantially similar to the former Act's § 1(19)
definition, which stated that "[a] person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of
this Act whenever the aggregate of his property. . . shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient
in amount to pay his debts." See In re Purbeck & Assoc., Ltd., 27 Bankr. 953, 954 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1983). The common and most crucial element of both definitions is the phrase "at
fair valuation." Furthermore, the former Act's definition of insolvency was triggered by the
former Act's equivalent of section 547, a provision that also avoided a transfer prior to filing
if the debtor was insolvent. See, e.g., Darby v. Shawnee Southwest, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 587,
589 (W.D. Okla. 1975); In re Hunter Press, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1976). Because
of the similarities between the present Code and the former Act, courts uniformly accept
cases interpreting equivalent provisions of the former Act as precedent. See Purbeck & As-
soc., 27 Bankr. at 954 (stating that due to the similarity in the definition of insolvency,
"cases which illuminate the old law" are useful in this proceeding).
89. See Schick Oil & Gas, 35 Bankr. at 285.
90. Hunter Press, 420 F. Supp. at 341.
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Engineering Co. v. Haight,9' articulated an interpretation of "fair
valuation" under the former Act's equivalent to section 547.92 The
Syracuse court determined that the interests of both debtor and
creditor are best served by using a standard based on the fair mar-
ket value that would result from a sale, within a reasonable period
of time, between a willing buyer and a willing seller."' This defini-
tion apparently avoids section 522's problem of identifying the ap-
propriate market; the benchmark here is the price between a will-
ing buyer and a willing seller in whatever market they may
transact. In adopting this interpretation of "fair value," the court
also specifically dismissed any possibility that a distress or forced
sale value would serve as the applicable standard.
94
In attempting to comport with the above valuation standard,
at least one court astutely has recognized that although book value
does not necessarily prove fair market value, "book value is not
precluded as evidence of fair market value. '95 Courts generally will
examine balance sheets and other financial statements, appraisals,
expert testimony, and any other evidence relevant to determining
the appropriate value.98 In contrast to the rigid formula for value
found in section 522, the Syracuse interpretation of fair value tol-
erates values that may fall below full fair market value. The Syra-
cuse requirement that the sale must occur within a reasonable pe-
91. 110 F.2d 468 (2nd Cir. 1940).
92. See supra note 88.
93. The court stated:
Fair valuation of an estate such as this might conceivably be based on forced sale
prices, or on fair market prices, or on so-called intrinsic values, irrespective of sale. A
proper regard for the interests of the bankrupt, as well as the interests of his creditors,
compels the conclusion that fair market price is the most equitable standard . . . . It
involves a value that can be made available for payment of debts within a reasonable
period of time . . . .And fair market value implies not only a "willing buyer", but a
"willing seller."
110 F.2d at 471.
94. Id. In accordance with Syracuse, Professor Collier has stated that fair value "signi-
fies the reasonable estimate of what can be realized from the assets by converting them into,
or reducing them to, cash under carefully guarded, if not idealized, conditions." 1 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 1.19, at 121 (14th ed. 1974).
95. Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955). The court stated,
"It is true that book value does not necessarily prove fair market value ...[b]ut, book
value is not inadmissible evidence of fair market value." Id. at 391.
96. Courts are aware of the technical nature of certain financial information and may
shy away from reliance on such information without testimony from an accountant explain-
ing the use of accounting practices and certain terms contained in the reports. See, e.g.,
Purbeck & Assoc., 27 Bankr. at 955; In re Windor Indus. Inc. 459 F. Supp. 270, 276 (N.D.
Tex. 1978). But see Schick Oil & Gas, 35 Bankr. at 285 (giving weight to unaudited financial
statements without accompanying testimony).
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riod of time, however, creates two problems.97 First, the Syracuse
approach seems to admit that a debtor's assets ordinarily may not
have a traditional fair market value during the preference period.
Second, the envisioned sale is purely hypothetical and, therefore,
does not contemplate any market at all.
When a creditor has secured a judgment lien upon, attached,
and sold or established a selling price for a debtor's assets, the fair
valuation standard also applies to the actual sale.98 The question
in this context becomes to what extent the sale price should serve
as a measure for "fair valuation." Although the Syracuse decision
suggests that a creditor's distressed or forced sale price would fall
short of the fair valuation standard, some courts have found no
difficulty in equating this sale price to "fair valuation." 99 In at-
tempting to obtain this result, a trustee seeking to prove a debtor's
insolvency may argue that the debtor's business status does not
warrant full retail value, even if given a reasonable period of time
in which to execute a retail sale. 00 If a creditor chooses to foreclose
and later sells to a dealer at wholesale, the trustee can argue that
the sale also represented the debtor's only option and, accordingly,
acurately reflected the fair value of the property at that time. A
creditor's sale for a depressed amount, perhaps the amount of the
loan, therefore, actually may boost a trustee's argument for insol-
vency and aid his case for avoiding the transfer. Thus, in contrast
to the limitation developed in Syracuse, the fair valuation stan-
dard tolerates even an actual sale, regardless of whether the sale
produces a depressed liquidation value.
To reduce the valuation further, trustees may argue for a re-
duction in the sale price to cover selling costs incurred by the cred-
itor.101 Courts, however, hold that because the price theoretically
represents a fair valuation, and because the only available fair
97. Professor Collier's definition, discussed supra note 94, is limited similarly. The
limitation in Collier's definition is that the sale must be "under carefully guarded, if not
idealized, conditions," suggesting that the sale ordinarily would not occur in that manner.
98. See, e.g., Windor Indus. Inc., 459 F. Supp. at 270; In re Hunter Press, Inc., 420 F.
Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1976); Darby v. Shawnee Southwest, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Okla.
1975).
99. See supra note 94.
100. For example, in Darby the debtor abandoned a business consisting primarily of
carpet inventory. The creditor, seeking to prove that debtor's assets exceeded liabilities,
argued for increasing the debtor's historical cost by the industry retail markup. The trustee,
however, successfully proved that because of the debtor's prior markups, lack of customers,
and dealer unwillingness to pay more than factory cost, the only possible sale within a rea-
sonable time would be to a dealer at factory cost. 399 F. Supp. at 591.
101. See, e.g., Darby, 399 F. Supp. at 592; Hunter Press, 420 F. Supp. at 341.
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market may be that in which the creditor actually sold, selling
costs should not reduce the sale price because those costs do not
affect the sale price negotiated between willing buyers and sellers
in ordinary transactions.10 2 This position, however, does not pre-
vent all costs incurred by the creditor from reducing the sale
price. 0 ' If, for example, the creditor incurred costs in making an
asset marketable or in finishing work in process, courts will allow a
reduction in the sale price.104 Therefore, costs that add value and
enhance marketability should be distinguished from those incident
to executing a sale.'0 5 In summary, although the Syracuse standard
of valuation initially may suggest traditional fair market value,
later courts have held the Syracuse standard to be satisfied by
foreclosure and sale for an amount just sufficient to satisfy the
debt. This amount perhaps can be reduced further by subtracting
certain costs incident to the sale.
Creditors, on the other hand, when arguing for a high asset
value to prove that the debtor was solvent at the time of the trans-
fer, often urge courts to value a company's assets by using a "going
concern" valuation standard. 08 At least one court has rejected the
"going concern" standard as incompatible with the balance sheet
concept required by the Code's definition of insolvency - liabili-
102. Hunter Press, 420 F. Supp. at 341. In Hunter Press the court stated:
In determining what such a willing buyer might pay a willing seller, I conclude that one
should not take into account the auction costs of selling the property. The balance
sheet approach calls upon the court to compare the value of the assets and the amount
of liabilities of the bankrupt at the time of the attachment. The value of these assets is
* * * [their] fair market price, what a willing buyer would pay for these assets under
ordinary selling conditions. Clearly that market price would not include any of the
costs of sale. An auction sale to liquidate property is moreover not generally a normal
selling condition. To deduct from the market price the costs of such a liquidating auc-
tion would be inconsistent with the balance sheet approach and unfairly decrease the
value of the debtor's assets.
Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., id. at 342. In In re Schindler, 223 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mo. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bone, 333 F.2d 984 (8th Cir.
1964), the court allowed a deduction for the costs of preparing crops and livestock for the
market, but did not discuss the attorney fees, auction fees, or negotiation costs of the actual
sales.
105. Hunter Press, 420 F. Supp. at 341-42. To illustrate further, when accounts receiv-
able are discounted, the discount represents the "risks and costs" of collection and reflects
the market value, not the costs, of a sale. Id.
106. See In re Utility Stationery Stores, 12 Bankr. 170, 177 (N.D. Ill. 1981); In re
Windor Indus., 459 F. Supp. 270, 276 (N.D. Tex. 1978); In re Perdue Housing Indus., Inc.,
437 F. Supp. 36, 37 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
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ties exceeding assets at a fair value.107 The going concern standard
also does not fit within the meaning of "fair value," judicially un-
derstood to mean the value resulting from a sale of an entity's in-
dividual assets, not the continuing viability of that entity.0 8 Other
courts have stated that going concern value is inappropriate only
when the company is merely "nominally in existence" or "on its
death bed"109-a condition perhaps easily proven by the trustee's
showing, for example, unpaid debtor liabilities."10 Finally, even
when a court examines going concern value, many assets eventually
are discounted to reflect the true position of the company, the
company's inventory is reduced to recognize obsolescence, and ac-
counts receivable are adjusted to reflect collectibility."'
Regardless of the method used, the statute clearly requires an
insolvency determination to be conducted by assigning a "fair val-
uation" to the debtor's assets." 2 The judiciary initially interpreted
fair valuation to mean the value obtainable in a market between a
willing seller, given a reasonable time to sell, and a willing buyer."
3
This market, however, exists only in theory. First, any sale is theo-
retical because the debtor, at the time of the transfer, has not filed
a petition for bankruptcy and, therefore, may not have contem-
plated selling assets in any market. Second, if the debtor desired to
sell its enterprise, the debtor likely would sell the entire entity for
the maximum going concern value achievable, including good will.
Furthermore, absent bankruptcy, the debtor would have more than
a reasonable time to sell the entity or a particular asset. Thus, the
Syracuse fair valuation standard is a purely hypothetical arrange-
ment because it appears to command less than what ordinary busi-
ness operations would yield, yet greater than what a forced liquida-
tion sale would produce. Case law illustrates that the hypothetical
nature of judicial interpretations of fair valuation causes quantifi-
cation difficulties and litigation uncertainty.
107. See Perdue Housing, 437 F. Supp. at 38.
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., Windor Indus., 459 F. Supp. at 276. The court noted:
The [creditor] argu[es] that the business should have been valued at its "going con-
cern" value. The fact that a company is nominally in existence is not persuasive in
valuing the company at a "going concern" valuation ... and where the company is on
its deathbed, the "going concern" value does not apply.
Id. (citations omitted).
110. Id. In Windor Indus. substantial amounts of payables were overdue by 60 days
and approximately $1.5 million was owed to nearly 200 creditors. Id.
111. See Utility Stationery Stores, 12 Bankr. at 176-77.
112. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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Despite diverse judicial interpretations, examining the various
policy considerations may aid in discerning what Congress in-
tended by the term "fair valuation." The initial task is to deter-
mine who benefits from the use of a given standard. A valuation
standard placing a high value on assets, such as the Syracuse fair
market value standard, is more likely to result in a solvency con-
clusion and, thus, benefit a particular transferee-creditor. A forced
sale or liquidation valuation standard, however, places a low value
on property and is more likely to lead to an insolvency conclusion.
As a result, all creditors will benefit because the transfer will be
avoided as a preference and the assets will be included in the
bankruptcy estate.
Perhaps the statutory presumption of insolvency during the
preference period, although easily rebutted, should imply that
Congress recognized that debtors may not be fairly classified as op-
erating in ordinary fair market conditions during this period. Judi-
cial decisions upholding the price obtained from an attachment
and forced sale as satisfying the "fair valuation" requirement fur-
ther support this proposition.1 14 The statutory language of "fair
valuation," however, does not, and perhaps should not, limit itself
to one particular method. A valuation could be fair for one type of
asset and unfair for another. Equity considerations inhere in the
definition by the use of the word "fair." A "fair valuation" seem-
ingly should consider the nature of the debtor, the type of asset
involved, and the condition of the market place-the same stan-
dards articulated under section 506(a). Although the term "fair
valuation" may comport with section 547's policy objectives by
favoring neither creditor nor debtor, the term creates confusion be-
cause judicial interpretations have created a hypothetical market.
A less confusing definition of fair valuation would be the high-
est realizable value existing at the time of the transfer, considering
the totality of circumstances surrounding the debtor. This con-
struction of fair valuation retains flexibility, but directs all inquir-
ies into individual asset valuations toward the same considerations.
For example, a debtor's inventory may have become obsolete due
to market conditions and, consequently, be worthy only of scrap
value; other inventory or assets may have appreciated highly. Fur-
thermore, the impetus that subsequently caused the bankruptcy
may have been completely unforeseen and, therefore, should not
affect the value of the asset at the time of transfer. Under a high-
114. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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est realizable value standard all factors relevant to the appropriate
value could be examined and the value will reflect reality. The
highest realizable value is fully consistent with a secured creditor's
expectation interest because if a debtor voluntarily decided to sell
assets to pay debts, the debtor would attempt to obtain the highest
price achievable. Although this standard may contemplate a sale
that in fact does not occur, the standard does not contemplate a
hypothetical market because it recognizes that, under the proper
circumstances, certain assets may not have a willing buyer, or,
under other circumstances, these assets may not attract a buyer
willing to pay a premium.
C. Section 547's "Greater Amount Received" Requirement:
Section 506(a) "Facts and Circumstances" Value
The second valuation issue contained within the preferential
transfer requirements is whether the transferee-creditor received a
greater amount than it otherwise would have received under the
distributive provisions of the Code. 11 5 Essentially, this requirement
is intended to prevent one creditor from improving, by means of a
prefiling transfer, its position with respect to other similarly situ-
ated creditors. 116 The requirement further supports section 547's
policy of ensuring an equal distribution among creditors"7 by com-
paring what the transferee-creditor receives from a transfer with
what other creditors would have received absent that transfer." 8
Section 506(a) bifurcates a creditor's claim into a secured and an
unsecured portion," 9 stating that a claim is secured only to the
extent of the collateral's value. 20 Generally, a prefiling transfer to
a fully secured claimant does not affect the bankruptcy estate and
will not provide the transferee-creditor with a greater amount than
at liquidation. 12 1 A claim is fully secured when the value of the
collateral securing the debt is at least equal to the amount of the
debt. 1 22 On some occasions a court will assume, in the absence of
proof bearing on value, that the collateral is equal to the amount of
115. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1982). See supra note 68 for text of the section.
116. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6138-39.
117. Id.; see Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d. 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1981).
118. Barash, 658 F.2d at 508.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1982); Barash, 658 F.2d at 507.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982); Barash, 658 F.2d at 511.
121. See id.; In re Conn, 9 Bankr. 431, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Windor
Indus., 459 F. Supp. 270, 278 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1982).
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the claim. 123 Generally, however, the party arguing that a transfer
was not preferential must carry the burden of proving a collateral
value sufficient to absorb the full claim.124 A secured creditor,
therefore, will argue for a high valuation of the asset in which the
creditor has security in order to prove that its claim was fully se-
cured and would have been satisfied in full even upon liquidation.
The converse of a fully secured creditor is an entirely un-
secured creditor. An unsecured creditor is termed a general credi-
tor; a general creditor must subordinate its Chapter 7 claims to
those of secured creditors. 12 5 Upon liquidation unsecured creditors
are paid a certain percentage of their claim.12 The percentages are
calculated by scheduling the assorted general creditor claims
against any assets remaining after secured creditors have been
paid.127 An unsecured creditor that receives a transfer during the
preference period faces virtually insurmountable difficulty in prov-
ing that the transfer was not preferential. For example, if a
debtor's assets are insufficient to satisfy all secured claims, an un-
secured claim will receive nothing and, thus, have a distribution
percentage of zero. In that situation any prior transfer automati-
cally will place the creditor in receipt of more than it would receive
at liquidation. 28 Thus, only assets valued in a manner sufficient to
create a 100% liquidation ratio allow an unsecured creditor to
show that it received a nonpreferential transfer, 12  an unlikely
event, however, because if a debtor could pay off all its creditors,
the debtor presumably would not be in bankruptcy.
Even when an unsecured creditor is scheduled to receive some
percentage of its claim upon liquidation, a payment in the 90 day
period still may result in the receipt of a greater amount. 130 In
Palmer City Products Co. v. Browns131 Justice Brandeis offered an
example of a creditor with a $10,000 claim, a 50% liquidation ratio,
and in receipt of a $1,000 payment during the preference period.
Because of the transfer, this creditor eventually will receive $5,500
($1,000 plus 50% of the remaining $9,000 claim); other creditors
with identical claims, but without a similar transfer, will receive
123. See, e.g., Conn, 9 Bankr. at 434.
124. See id.






131. 297 U.S. 227, 229 (1936).
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only $5,000.111 Justice Brandeis' example emphasizes that a proper
analysis must focus both on the amount of the transfer, which may
be below the distribution percentage, and on any forthcoming re-
ceipt upon liquidation. 133 Thus, an unsecured or partially secured
creditor with any liquidation percentage below 100% risks having
its prefiling transfer classified as preferential. 34
At least one court, however, has noted that a creditor with a
distribution percentage below 100 may not always face an insur-
mountable challenge in denying that its transfer was preferential.
The recent United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decision in In re Shurtlef'38 justified that position by distinguish-
ing its facts from the facts in Palmer City Products. In Shurtleff
the creditor received a prefiling payment in full satisfaction of a
claim, whereas in Palmer City Products the creditor received a
payment "on account" and was forced to seek further satisfaction
upon liquidation. 138 The Shurtleff court held that because the
transferees would have a claim for breach of contract if the trans-
fer were avoided and no claim if the transfer remained intact, the
value of the transferred items should be compared to possible
damages resulting from a breach of contract.137 The court re-
manded the case for a finding of value, holding that the transfer
would be avoided as a preference only if the value of the trans-
ferred items was greater than the resulting possible damages for
breach.38" Thus, in light of Shurtleff, a transfer to an unsecured
creditor with a distribution percentage of less than 100% may not
necessarily result in a preferential transfer.
Valuation is perhaps most significant when a creditor is par-
tially secured. Under section 506(a) a valuation of collateral deter-
mines the extent to which a creditor's claim is secured.3 9 As noted
above, a fully secured creditor can defend a preference attack,1
40
but a partially secured creditor is in a different position. A par-
tially secured creditor may receive more from a transfer during the
preference period than it would receive at liquidation. In Barash v.
132. Id.
133. See Barash, 658 F.2d at 509.
134. See Utility Stationery Stores, 12 Bankr. at 179.




139. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1982). See infra note 147 for text of § 506(a).
140. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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Public Finance4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit held that transfers to a partially secured creditor are
charged first to the unsecured portion of the debt. 42 Thus, because
Barash allocates transfers during the preference period to the un-
secured portion of a claim, the transfer amount plus the amount
received at liquidation from the secured claim may result in the
creditor receiving more than its share. 143 Barash's allocation of a
partially secured creditor's transfer causes that creditor to enjoy a
better position than similarly situated creditors not in receipt of a
transfer.144 Barash, therefore, motivates secured creditors to prove
a collateral value at least sufficient to absorb both the secured and
unsecured portions of the claim.
Although both the Barash and Shurtleff courts clearly identi-
fied when and how a valuation issue arises under section 547,145
141. 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
142. Id. at 508-09.
143. The Barash court described the results of a transfer to a partially secured credi-
tor as follows:
[I]f upon liquidation unsecured creditors would be paid 20% of their claims (based on
remaining assets and scheduled claims after secured creditors are paid), to defeat a
trustee's avoidance rights a creditor would have to show only that the payments re-
ceived during the 90-day period do not exceed 20% of the creditor's unsecured claim.
This sole comparison, however, does not account for what happens thereafter. If the
payments made were less than 20%, there would be no preference and the creditor
would keep the payments and later also receive a pro-rata share of the balance of his
claim. In the final analysis, this would violate the fundamental principle of equal distri-
bution among a class of claims.
Section 547(b)(5) is directed at transfers which enable creditors to receive more
than they would have received had the estate been liquidated and the disputed transfer
not been made. As long as the transfers diminish the bankrupt's estate available for
distribution, creditors who are allowed to keep transfers would be enabled to receive
more than their share. The creditors in the instant case must account for the payments
they received during the 90 days preceding the bankruptcy filing, or they will ulti-
mately receive a larger share of their unsecured claims than other unsecured creditors.
Of course, they will still receive the full benefit of their collateral as to their secured
claims.
Id. (emphasis in original).
144. Id. See also Windor Indus., 459 F. Supp. at 278, for a parallel analysis reaching
the same conclusion as Barash three years prior to Barash. Neither the Barash court nor
later courts, however, have relied on Windor.
145. The Barash court stated: "Section 506(a) provides that a debt is secured only to
the extent of the value of the collateral. Any remaining amount is an unsecured claim. Valu-
ation of collateral is thus crucial to determining the amount of the preferences." 658 F.2d at
511. The Shurtleff court stated:
[W]e are unsure whether the bankruptcy court should have deducted the transaction
costs of a sale in computing the value of the property transferred. Section 547(b) itself
does not address the method by which transferred property should be appraised. Nor
does the Code appear to authorize a uniform method for valuation. For example, in
assessing the extent of a creditor's secured status, courts are to determine the value of
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neither court resolved the issue. 146 Both courts recognized that sec-
tion 506(a) should control in a value determination, 4 7 but neither
court applied that section or refined that section's general princi-
ples. Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, in In re Lacklow Brothers, 4  considered
whether the bankruptcy court applied the appropriate method of
valuation.1 49 The issue arose in a context similar to that found in
Barash: the trustee argued that the collateral value was insufficient
to absorb the creditor's partially secured claim and that the trans-
fer should be avoided. 50 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the collateral value was sufficient to cover the creditor's claim at
collateral "in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or
use of such property." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
778 F.2d. at 1422.
146. The Barash court declined to reach a conclusion on the valuation issue, stating:
We hold that regular installment payments on consumer debts, made within 90 days
preceding the filing of a bankruptcy petition, may be avoided as preferential transfers
to the extent the payments are credited to unsecured claims. The bankruptcy court
must determine the value of collateral on a case-by-case basis to ascertain the extent of
the preferences, in keeping with the bifurcation of debts into secured and unsecured
claims under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
658 F.2d at 512.
The Shurtleff court also declined to reach a conclusion on the valuation issue:
If the bankruptcy court was correct in finding that the apartments had a net value of
$27,500, the transfer was preferential, to repeat, only as to Broadway.
This would justify a reversal of the district court's judgment with a remand to
make it conform with the conclusion. We are, however, reluctant to do so. This is be-
cause we are unsure whether the bankruptcy court erred in calculating the net value of
the apartments, and thus in applying 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5).
778 F.2d at 1423.
147. Section 506(a) states that "value shall be determined in light of the purpose of
the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest."
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
The legislative history confirms that the valuation standard was intended to be left
open ended. "While courts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis, the subsec-
tion makes it clear that valuation is to be determined in light of the purpose of the valua-
tion and the proposed disposition or use of the subject property." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 356, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6312. "'Value'
does not necessarily contemplate the forced sale or liquidation value of the collateral; nor
does it always imply a full going concern value. Courts will have to determine value on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the competing interests in
the case." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5854.
148. 752 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1985).
149. Id. at 1531. The court noted, "The sole issue we must resolve is whether the
district court was clearly erroneous in applying the 'ongoing concern' value in determining
[that the] Creditor had not received preferential payments under section 547(b) .... " Id.
150. Id. at 1530-31.
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the time of the transfer.15 After citing section 506(a) for the guid-
ing principles, the court found that because the only evidence
bearing on value at the appropriate time reflected "ongoing con-
cern" value, ongoing concern value "is not only more appropriate,
but is even mandatory. "152
Although one court has characterized the Lacklow Brothers
holding as resulting solely from "a failure of proof,"' 53 the opinion
does provide some guidance into valuation determination. While
the Barash and Shurtleff courts addressed valuation only to recog-
nize that the issue should be resolved by the lower courts, 54 the
Lacklow Brothers court addressed the question of whether the
lower court applied the appropriate standard. 55 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court's view that a valuation of property for
purposes of a different Code section should not control valuation
of that property for purposes of section 547. 15 Thus, the Lacklow
Brothers court firmly established the section-by-section factual
analysis 57 that Barash158 and Shurteff"59 also adopted for a sec-
tion 506(a) valuation under section 547. The Lacklow Brothers
court also considered statements from Professor Collier'60 that sug-
gested applying a "liquidation" value for a Chapter 7 liquidation
and a "going concern" value for a Chapter 11 reorganization.' 6 "
Professor Collier's treatise, however, also recognized the flexibility
intended under section 506(a). In light of Professor Collier's state-
ments, the Lacklow Brothers court was justified in affirming "going
concern value" as the appropriate standard, even within the liqui-
dation context of section 547.162
In a section 547 valuation for purposes of the "greater amount
received" requirement, when a transferee-creditor is partially se-
151. Id. at 1532.
152. Id. By "ongoing concern" value, the court was referring to certain computerized
accounting reports prepared by the debtor and used by the creditor as a basis for extending
credit. Although the trustee challenged the validity of the reports, the trustee presented no
other evidence showing value at the time of transfer. The trustee only presented the value
that the creditor actually received upon liquidation six months after the filing for
bankruptcy.
153. See In re Olympic Foundry, 51 Bankr. 428, 431 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1985).
154. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
156. Lacklow Bros., 752 F.2d at 1530 n.3.
157. Id. at 1532.
158. 658 F.2d at 512.
159. 778 F.2d at 1422.
160. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.41, at 129 (15th ed. 1984).




cured the valuation should follow the section 506(a) method of val-
uation.16 3 Under circumstances similar to the unsecured creditor
situation in Shurtleff, however, section 506(a) is not incorporated
directly because section 506(a) applies only to a secured claim. Al-
though the Shurtlef court did not address specifically the valua-
tion issue,6 the standard should be similar to that articulated in
section 506(a). Regardless of whether a creditor has a right, due to
the creditor's secured status or the creditor's distribution percent-
age, to payment, a transfer may be preferential if it causes a credi-
tor to receive more than what the creditor has a right to receive at
liquidation. In both instances the valuation determines the amount
that the creditor has a right to receive.
D. Uniformity Between Section 506(a) and "Fair Valuation"
Unfortunately, the section 506(a) test still awaits sufficient ap-
plication under section 547 for a trend to develop. A trend, how-
ever, may never emerge because of the broad guidelines established
by section 506(a)'s statutory language and legislative history.'6 5
Nevertheless, the valuation standard should be the same for both
the "insolvency" and "greater amount received" requirements of
section 547 for proving a preferential transfer. Valuation under the
insolvency requirement has spanned from approaching traditional
fair market value to the value resulting from property that has
been foreclosed and sold, a result perhaps justified by the word
"fair" in the "fair valuation" requirement. 166 The results, if not the
methods, approach those contemplated by section 506(a). The in-
solvency requirement also operates to determine the appropriate
amount that a creditor has a right to receive. If the debtor is insol-
vent during the preference period, the debtor effectively is bank-
rupt at that time and should be unable to transfer property to al-
low a creditor to receive more than the creditor has a right to
receive. Essentially, general bankruptcy distribution principles ef-
fectively relate back to the preference period in the event that the
debtor is deemed insolvent. The result is twofold: (1) insolvency
valuation cases should open up more fully to a "facts and circum-
stances" analysis similar to that of section 506(a); and (2) greater
amount received cases may look to insolvency cases for help in
163. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying note
155.
165. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
166. See text following note 115.
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treating identical cases similarly.
IV. SECTION 548 FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
A. Mechanics Underlying the Valuation Issue
Section 548167 of the Code parallels section 547 in empowering
a trustee to avoid certain transfers of items in which the debtor
had an interest. The trustee's power to avoid transfers is triggered
either if the transfer is fraudulent or if the debtor fails to receive a
reasonably equivalent value for the transferred property or inter-
est.""s The goal of section 548 is to prevent the debtor from fraudu-
lently excluding property from the bankruptcy estate.169 The un-
derlying policy is that creditors are entitled to benefit from the
debtor's full equity in property that may affect the bankruptcy es-
tate."1 Any transfer or obligation incurred by the debtor within
one year before filing for bankruptcy falls within the scrutiny of
section 548.'17
Section 548 empowers a trustee to avoid a transfer on two
grounds. First, the trustee may avoid a transfer that the debtor
executed with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" any pre-
sent or subsequent creditor.17 2 Second, the trustee may avoid the
transfer: (1) if the debtor "received less than a reasonably
equivalent value" 73 for the property transferred, thus creating a
167. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982).
168. Id. § 548 (a). The entire section states as follows:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year
before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor-(1) made such transfer or
incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to
which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer occurred or
such obligation was incurred, indebted; or (2)(A) received less than a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and (B)(i) was insolvent
on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or became
insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation; (ii) was engaged in business, or was
about to engage in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the
debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or (iii) intended to incur, or believed that
the debtor would incur, debts that would go beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such
debts matured.
Id.
169. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 375, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODvE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6331.
170. See Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and It's Proper Domain, 38
VAND. L. REv. 829 (1985).
171. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982).
172. Id. § 548(a)(1).
173. Id. § 548(a)(2)(A).
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valuation issue; and (2) if in making the transfer the debtor was or
became insolvent, was left with unreasonably small capital for a
business, or intended to incur debts beyond its ability to pay.17 4
One court treated the reasonably equivalent value requirement
as if Congress "created an irrebuttable presumption of fraud in
certain cases of insufficient consideration received for a transferred
item.'1 75 Defendants in section 548 cases are usually the transfer-
ees, who argue that they paid a "reasonably equivalent value" for
what they acquired.17 6 Plaintiffs and trustees, and sometimes even
debtors,' 7 argue that the consideration fell below a "reasonably
equivalent value" of the interest transferred. If successful, the
plaintiff either may have the transfer avoided or may recover any
deficiency in consideration.
178
Section 548 defines value as "property, or satisfaction or se-
curity of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not
include an unperformed promise. 17' 9 That definition, however,
identifies only the items classified as having "value," not the stan-
dard by which to measure a "reasonably equivalent value" for the
item transferred. The legislative history is equally unhelpful in
providing guidance on the issue. 80
One of the most difficult applications of section 548 concerns
the foreclosure sale. Bankruptcy trustees and debtors often employ
section 548 to avoid transfers of property sold pursuant to a fore-
closure sale.18' Foreclosure sales commonly conclude with the judg-
174. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B).
175. In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.) (Farris, J., concurring), cert. denied
sub nom. Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
176. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 48 Bankr. 497 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Dudley, 38
Bankr. 666 (Bankr. M.D. Penn. 1984).
177. See In re Dudley, 38 Bankr. at 668.
178. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1982).
179. Id. § 548(d)(2)(A).
180. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 375, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6331.
The record states:
This section is derived in large part from section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act. It permits
the trustee to avoid transfers by the debtor in fraud of his creditors. Its history dates
from the statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5 (1570). The trustee may avoid fraudulent transfers or
obligations if made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a past or future
creditor. Transfers made for less than a reasonably equivalent consideration are also
vulnerable if the debtor was or thereby became insolvent, was engaged in business with
an unreasonably small capital, or intended to incur debts that would be beyond his
ability to repay.
Id.
181. See, e.g., In re Hulm, 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. First
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); Abramsom v. Lakewood Bank, 647
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ment creditor extending the only bid and purchasing the property
for the amount of the debt, usually a substantial percentage below
what would be considered traditional fair market value.1 8 2 This
fact pattern prompts trustees to assert that the property was sold
for less than a reasonably equivalent value because the price fell
below a "reasonable equivalent" to fair market value. The crucial
question becomes to what standard of value must the sale price be
reasonably equivalent.183
Most courts seem to accept, without comment, that the appro-
priate standard is fair market value.1 84 This phenomenon, however,
results in the conceptually confusing comparison of a foreclosure
sale price to a fair market value price. One court found this com-
parison unrealistic because it ignores the "realities of the foreclo-
sure market."185 Foreclosure sales typically yield a much lower sell-
ing price than a regular sale on the open market.
186
In establishing the "reasonably equivalent value" requirement,
Congress could have intended two interpretations. Congress could
have intended that the selling price be reasonably equivalent to
the price that could be obtained from a voluntary sale on the open
market, or that it be reasonably equivalent to the price that could
be obtained from a properly conducted foreclosure sale. Although
courts do not frame the conflict in the above terms, they are split
precisely in that manner.8 "
F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Durrett v. Washington
Nat'l Bank, 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1981); see also In re Frank, 39 Bankr. 166, 169-70
(Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1984) (giving a summary of the various transfers falling under section
547). An issue parallel to the proper meaning of "reasonable equivalence" is whether a fore-
closure sale even constitutes a transfer within the meaning of section 548. See Erlich, Avoid-
ance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances: Accommodating State and Federal
Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 933 (1985); Baird & Jackson, supra note 170, at 829, 843-50;
Alden, Gross & Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Propos-
als for Solving the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus. LAW. 1605 (1983). For a recent case outlining
the split among the circuit courts, see Lower Downtown Assoc. v. Barzosbanc Say. Ass'n, 52
Bankr. 662 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
182. See In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434, 446 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
183. Both the Code language and the legislative history left open this question. See
supra note 181 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., In re Willis, 48 Bankr. 295, 301 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).
185. In re Upham, 48 Bankr. 695, 697 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1985). The court stated, "In
a foreclosure sale situation, such as this, the standard that reasonably equivalent value must
be a comparison between the foreclosure sale price and the appraised market value is not
realistic. Such a standard would neglect to take into consideration the realities of the fore-
closure market." Id.
186. See Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 446.
187. Many courts frame the issue as whether they should follow Durrett v. Washing-
ton National Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980), or In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr.
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B. Opposing Judicial Responses
1. Durrett: Reasonably Equivalent to Fair Market Value
The Fifth Circuit's Durret v. Washington National Insurance
Co. 188 decision is the landmark opinion holding that section 548
requires a foreclosure sale price to be reasonably equivalent to fair
market value. Although Durrett was decided under the old Bank-
ruptcy Act, 189 the decision has been accepted as the majority view
under the new Code.190 In spite of Durrett's wide acceptance, the
court's holding was predicated more on the facts of the case than
on an analysis of the Code. 191 The court calculated the foreclosure
sale price as a percentage of the property's fair market value
(57.7%) and, because no other court had allowed a percentage be-
low 70%, held that the price was not reasonably equivalent to fair
market value.'92 Thus, the court did not specifically hold that 70%
of fair market value is the minimum requirement for reasonable
equivalence. 93 The court also did not articulate a rationale for
holding that the price should be reasonably equivalent to fair mar-
ket value and not to foreclosure market value.194 Later courts, how-
ever, have extrapolated Durrett to support these principles.
Many courts initially extended Durrett to an extreme by stat-
ing that Durrett stands for the proposition that 70% of fair mar-
9th Cir. 1982), aft'd, 725 F.2d. 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Madrid v. Lawyers
Title Ins. Corp., 469 U.S. 833 (1984). See, e.g., In re Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666, 669 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1984); In re Frank, 39 Bankr. 166, 170 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1984); In re Richardson,
23 Bankr. 434, 444 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
188. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
189. Durrett was decided under section 67(d) of the former Act. That section provided
in pertinent part: "(1) For the purposes of, and exclusively applicable to this subdivision:
... (e) consideration given for the property or obligation of a debtor is "fair" (1) when, in
good faith, in exchange and as a fair equivalent therefore, property is transferred." 621 F.2d
at 202 n.2 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976)).
190. Courts following Durrett fall into two categories: one treats 70% of the fair mar-
ket value as the standard for avoiding foreclosure sales, see, e.g., In re Jacobson, 48 Bankr.
497 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); In re
Berge, 33 Bankr. 642 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); In re Jones, 20 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1982), the other declines to follow an absolute percentage, but agrees that a sale can be
avoided for lack of reasonably equivalent value even if state foreclosure law is not violated,
In re Hulm, 45 Bankr. 523 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984); In re Frank, 39 Bankr. 166 (Bankr. E.D.
N.Y. 1984); In re Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984); In re Carr, 34 Bankr. 653
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
191. Accord In re Hulm, 45 Bankr. 523, 527 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984).
192. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203.
193. Later courts, however, recognized what is known as the Durrett rule of 70%. See
In re Jacobson, 48 Bankr. 497, 499 n.2 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
194. For an excellent discussion of this distinction, see In re Richardson, 23 Bankr.
434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
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ket value is the absolute minimum for reasonably equivalent
value.1 95 Later decisions have recognized, however, that Durrett
does not stand for this proposition. 196 These decisions suggest that
a percentage below fair market value that still is reasonably
equivalent should receive a section 506(a)-type analysis, which
considers the circumstances of each case, the nature of the parties,
and the property in question. 197 Courts adopting a section 506(a)-
type analysis avoid many computational difficulties by not adher-
ing to a strict percentage. 198 For example, a foreclosure sale may be
intertwined with various other mortgages and liens.199 Thus, in
computing reasonable equivalence the fair market value, inclusive
of the debtor's equity, should be compared to what the purchaser
paid, giving full consideration to any liabilities assumed.2 0 0 In
short, these decisions hold that each transaction should be evalu-
ated to determine the exact values given up and received. One
court recently stated that "[w]here the price paid in view of all the
attended factors in a particular case is so grossly inadequate as to
shock the court's conscience, then the price may be said to be less
than reasonably equivalent. 20 1 Although confusion arose over the
70% standard that developed from Durrett, the primary reason for
Durrett's following appears to lie in its willingness to avoid a fore-
closure sale if it fails to produce a price reasonably equivalent to
the property's fair market value, even when the sale fully comports
with state foreclosure law.
195. See, e.g., In re Jacobson, 48 Bankr. 497 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Coleman,
21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); cf. In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434, 448 n.21
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
196. See, e.g., In re Fargo Biltmore Hotel Corp., 49 Bankr. 782, 788 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1985); In re Frank, 39 Bankr. 166, 176 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1984); In re Richardson, 23 Bankr.
434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); In re Jones, 20 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
197. The Richardson court stated:
Naturally, reasonable equivalence will depend on the facts of each case. In some cases,
no less than 100 percent of fair market value may be a reasonable price. In all cases,
facts such as "the bargaining position of the parties. . . and the marketability of the
property transferred" will be relevant.
23 Bankr. at 448 (quoting Cook, Fraudulent Transfer Liability Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 17 Hous. L. Rav. 263, 278 (1980)); see also Hulm, 45 Bankr. at 528.
198. See Fargo Biltmore Hotel, 49 Bankr. at 788-89.
199. See, e.g., Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 445; Fargo Biltmore Hotel, 49 Bankr. at 788.
200. Fargo Biltmore Hotel, 49 Bankr. at 788-89.
201. Id. at 789.
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2. Madrid: Reasonably Equivalent to
Foreclosure Market Value
Following the Durrett opinion the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel for the Ninth Circuit, in In re Madrid, °2 held that "the con-
sideration received at a non-collusive, regularly conducted public
[foreclosure] sale satisfies the reasonably equivalent value require-
ment. ' 20 3 By holding that a properly conducted foreclosure sale
conclusively produces a reasonably equivalent value, the Madrid
court avoided the conceptual discomfort of comparing fair market
value to foreclosure market value.204 The Durrett court had
avoided that discomfort by indexing fair market value by 70% to
equate fair market value with its reasonable equivalent in the fore-
closure market.
20 5
Although the sale price in Madrid was only a very small mar-
gin below the Durrett 70% standard,20 8 the Madrid holding repre-
sents a very different conceptual analysis. The Madrid court did
not hold that 70% is an inappropriate index for fair market value,
but held that fair market value simply is not the value to which
the sale must be reasonably equivalent. 0 7 The Madrid court ac-
knowledged that a section 548 valuation is unavoidably immersed
in the realities of a foreclosure sale. The Madrid court acknowl-
edged that general foreclosure law requires some element of fraud,
unfairness, or oppression actually to cause an inadequate price
before the foreclosure price becomes subject to avoidance as a
202. 21 Bankr. 424, 425 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), afl'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
203. Id. at 425.
204. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 183.
207. Although the Madrid approach is conceptually different from Durrett, the Ma-
drid court did examine the foundation for the 70% rule. The Madrid court noted that Dur-
rett, in support of its 70% standard, cited only one case in which the sale was voluntary,
and that sale was to the "mother of the principal stockholder of the debtor corporation."
Madrid, 21 Bankr. at 426. The Madrid court then concluded by factual analogy that the
Durrett 70% rule has a tainted foundation because it includes voluntary private transfers.
See id.
The court went on to object to the Durrett rule on theoretical grounds:
However valid it may be to hold that less than 70% of fair market value is not a fair
equivalent for a private transfer to an insider, application of that standard to regularly
conducted public sales is questionable. We decline to follow Durrett's 70% fair market
value rule for the reason that a regularly conducted sale, open to all bidders and all





fradulent transfer.2 0 8 Thus, the Madrid court sought compatability
with foreclosure principles by holding that a foreclosure sale must
have some defect before it is avoidable as a fraudulent convey-
ance.20 9 In addition, the court was reluctant to adopt a standard
that empowers a bankruptcy trustee to set aside a foreclosure sale
conducted in full compliance with state law.210
For a variety of reasons, the Madrid holding has not gained
the acceptance of a majority of courts.2 11 The Madrid decision,
however, recently received additional support from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In In re Winshall
Settlers' Trust212 the Sixth Circuit adopted the Madrid view with-
out providing additional analysis. 13 In another recent decision,
which mentioned neither Madrid nor Winshall Settlers' Trust, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New
York refused to upset a properly conducted foreclosure sale on
grounds that the sale price lacked reasonable equivalence in value
to the property sold.214
208. The Madrid court made the following statements with respect to foreclosure law:
If we consider the question of price adequacy in the context of foreclosure law we find,
not suprisingly, that mere inadequacy will not upset a foreclosure sale. "[T]here must
be in addition proof of some element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression as accounts for
and brings about the inadequacy of price." . . . The trial court's construction of 548
would radically alter these rules. Any foreclosure sale which failed to bring 70% of the
property's market value could be set aside by a bankruptcy trustee or a debtor-in-
possession for a period of one year.
Id. at 427 (citations omitted). One must question whether the Code itself was meant to alter
the above rules because the thrust of section 548(a)(2) is that an inadequate price alone can
render a transfer fraudulent.
209. Id.
210. The court felt that state foreclosure law should blend with, not be changed by,
fraudulent conveyance law. Thus, the only compatible standard would be to interpret "rea-
sonably equivalent" as the value received at a sale without "defects," as defined under state
law. Id.
211. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
212. 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985).
213. The court first held that the foreclosure sale did not constitute a transfer and
then stated:
Even if the sale in question were a transfer subject to § 548, the better view is that
reasonable equivalence for the purposes of a foreclosure sale under § 548(a)(2)(A)
should be consonant with the state law of fraudulent conveyances. The Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel in In re Madrid, noting the well-nigh universal rule that mere inade-
quacy of price alone does not justify setting aside an execution sale and that generally
there must be in addition proof of some element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression
accounting for the inadequacy in price, concluded that following the Durrett holding
would radically alter these rules (citation omitted).
Id. at 1139.
214. In re Upham, 48 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1985). The court concluded that
"[t]he highest bid received in a properly conducted foreclosure action, where there has been
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Under these cases, therefore, securing an affirmation of the
foreclosure sale price lies in stressing the incompatability of requir-
ing a price to be reasonably equivalent to fair market value when
no state law requirements have been violated.21 5 Thus, the lower
courts are faced with choosing between the clear holding of Dur-
rett in the Fifth Circuit and the tacit holding of Madrid in the
Ninth Circuit.216 Durrett has emerged the clear winner, with the
lower courts providing the missing rebuttal to Madrid.11
C. Analysis: Comparison of Durrett and Madrid
Subsequent decisions have recognized that the Madrid holding
essentially created an irrebuttable presumption that when state
foreclosure sale law is followed, selling prices will be deemed to be
reasonably equivalent to the value of the property sold. 18 Courts
following Durrett have noted that this presumption conflicts with
the trustee's power to prove that a sale falls below the section 548
reasonable equivalence standard set by Congress.21 9 The problem
in interpreting and applying section 548 is that Congress did not
set a standard by which to measure reasonable equivalence. Courts
following Durrett justify their interpretation of reasonable equiva-
lence by promoting it as a method to combat circumstances in
which no buyers bid on the property and the creditor simply sells
the property to itself for the amount of the debt.2 2 0 Even when
buyers appear, often they do not bid more than the debt amount
because they are aware that creditors merely wish to satisfy their
outstanding obligation.22'1 Because of these circumstances, Durrett
no complaint of foul play or improper process, is the reasonably equivalent value of that
property." Id. at 697.
215. Id.; see supra note 208 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. At least one court, however, felt that
following Madrid was obligatory, but did so only under protest. See In re Coleman, 21
Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982). The Coleman court stated its dislike for Durrett as
follows:
[T]he court will state at this time that the holding of Durrett and cases following
thereafter cast a cloud upon mortgages and trust deeds .... [G]enerally foreclosure
sales "do not bring the best price, but most states, including Texas, mandate public
sales when foreclosure is the creditor's remedy." If this court were free to do so it
would [not] follow [Durrett].
Id. at 834.
218. Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 446; accord In re New Yorketown Assocs., 40 Bankr.
701, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
219. Hulm, 45 Bankr. at 526; New Yorketown Assoc., 40 Bankr. at 706.
220. See, e.g., Hulm, 45 Bankr. at 528; Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 446.
221. See Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 446.
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proponents argue, the foreclosure sale price may not merit an ir-
rebuttable presumption of reasonable equivalence in value.222 Fur-
thermore, as the Madrid dissent recognized, allowing a rebuttal to
the presumption of reasonable equivalence is meritorious.223
A statutory construction argument also favors allowing a trus-
tee to avoid a properly conducted foreclosure sale that does not
produce a reasonably equivalent value. Under Madrid a trustee
may attack a foreclosure sale only by alleging bad faith, fraud, or
collusion in the sale. 24 When Congress enacted section 548 of the
Code, however, Congress intentionally discarded 225 the former
Act's good faith element 228 in favor of the perceived more objective
standard of reasonable equivalence in value.227 At least one court
has recognized that to adopt Madrid essentially would require the
trustee to read good faith back into section 548, an element Con-
gress intended to discard.228
Perhaps the strongest argument levied against Durrett focuses
on the decision's disruptive effect on state foreclosure law and
foreclosure markets.22 9 Those effects allegedly cast a "cloud upon
mortgages and trust deeds" by allowing sales consummated one
year before the debtor's filing to be avoided for lack of reasonably
equivalent value.280 Durrett opponents view the "cloud" as having
the spiral effect of reducing the number of bidders at foreclosure
sales, which in turn further decreases prices obtained at those sales
and creates an even greater suspicion of a lack of reasonably
equivalent value being achieved.231
Durrett supporters respond with a number of arguments.
They note that many state laws do not allow the disruption of a
foreclosure sale solely because the sale obtained an inadequate
price. 2  Thus, to the extent the reasonable equivalence standard
conflicts with a state law, that state law should not deter or control
222. Id.
223. Madrid, 21 Bankr. at 427, 429 (Volinn, J., dissenting).
224. See Frank, 39 Bankr. at 175; Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 447.
225. See Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 447, for support of the proposition that Congress
intentionally discarded the good faith requirement.
226. Bankruptcy Act § 67 incorporated fraud and collusion, in addition to bad faith, as
causes of action available to the trustee.
227. See Erlich, supra note 170, at 945.
228. Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 447.
229. See Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982).
230. Id.
231. See id.; Baird & Jackson, supra note 181, at 846.
232. Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 447.
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the application of the federal standard. 3 The primary goal of sec-
tion 548 is to promote the equal distribution of a debtors' assets, a
goal not nurtured by state foreclosure law.23 4 Although some Code
provisions were designed to function under a concurrent applica-
tion of state law,23 5 section 548 omits any reference to examining
state foreclosure law for a determination of reasonably equivalent
value. Furthermore, the argument that Durrett causes an unprece-
dented interference with state law is refuted by reference to other
provisions allowing the trustee to avoid certain transfers-for ex-
ample, section 547 preferential transfers and section 545 statutory
liens. 3 6 Moreover, Durrett followers acknowledge the policy con-
cerns expressed with respect to the detrimental effect on foreclo-
sure markets, but feel that those concerns are better directed to
Congress because Congress created the provisions causing the dis-
ruptive effect.
231
To bring these competing views back into the valuation con-
text, Durrett suggests an interpretation of reasonably equivalent
value that allows a trustee to avoid a sale falling below some per-
centage of fair market value. 8 Madrid, on the other hand, sug-
gests that reasonable equivalence is a measure unavoidably con-
fined within foreclosure market realities and allows the trustee to
avoid a sale only if it falls outside the requirements of state fore-
closure law. 39 Madrid adherents insist that the realities of the
foreclosure market should not allow a comparison of foreclosure
sale value to fair market value. These proponents argue that the
price received in a proper foreclosure sale represents the value
most reasonably equivalent to the property's worth at the time of
the sale and most reasonably equivalent to the property's worth
within the market comprised of foreclosure sale buyers. 40
The issue properly stated, therefore, is to what standard must
the sale. price be reasonably equivalent, fair market value or fore-
closure market value. Neither statutory language nor legislative
history addresses the question.4 1 One congressional indication
favoring the Durret standard may lie in the 1984 amendment to
233. Id.
234. Frank, 39 Bankr. at 179.
235. Id. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b), 544(b), 547(e)(1)-(2), 548(d)(1) (1982).
236. Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 448.
237. Id.
238. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
240. Id.
241. See supra note 187.
[Vol. 40:177
BANKRUPTCY VALUATION
section 548, which defines "transfer" to include both voluntary and
involuntary sales.2 42 By including the word "involuntary," some
commentators believe that Congress sought to settle the debate
over whether foreclosure sales even constitute a "transfer" under
section 548.4' The amendment supports the Durrett approach be-
cause under the Durrett analysis a court first must find that a fore-
closure sale is a transfer before it can avoid the sale; therefore, be-
cause the Circuit Courts of Appeal are split on the transfer issue,
the amendment appears to support the trustee's power to avoid a
foreclosure sale. The amendment, however, still does not articulate
which standard a court should use to measure reasonable equiva-
lence. Congress, however, must have been aware of the Durrett ap-
proach of avoiding sales for falling below a certain percentage of
fair market value and, thus, could have calmed the effect of Dur-
rett by drafting a presumption in support of the foreclosure sale
price. Congressional silence, however, is dubious support.
One commentator has suggested that although Durrett and
Madrid seem mutually exclusive, the two cases can be reconciled
into a more cohesive analysis. 4 A reconciliation of the two views
requires identifying the cause of the problem that the Durrett view
seeks to solve: inadequate prices from foreclosure sales. The cause
may be the procedures employed for those sales. One commentator
has suggested the following as some of the factors creating low
foreclosure sale prices: (1) the sale lacks appropriate notice mecha-
nisms to properly inform a full range of investors; (2) the require-
ment of an all cash purchase excludes purchasers without financ-
ing; and (3) the rapid sale mechanism does not allow a proper
inquiry into the soundness of the title or the availability of insur-
ance. 45 Thus, under an idealized state foreclosure law system that
more closely approaches the normal retail market, the sale could
receive a Madrid presumption of reasonable equivalence. Absent a
242. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (Supp. 1986).
243. See Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 780 n.175
(1984); see also Lower Downtown Assoc. v. Barzosbanc Sav. Ass'n., 52 Bankr. 662 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1985). The Lower Downtown Assoc. court noted, without citation, that a sponsor of
the amendment failed to amend further the statute to provide that "if a purchaser at a
noncollusive foreclosure sale bid at least the full amount of the debt secured by the prop-
erty, the bid would conclusively constitute reasonable equivalent value for the property."
Lower Downtown Assoc., 52 Bankr. at 664-65. But see In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758
F.2d 1136, 1138-39 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (adopting the view that a foreclosure sale is not a
transfer, even in the face of the new amendment, and claiming that there is no reference to
the amendment in the legislative history).
244. See Erlich, supra note 181, at 979-80.
245. Id. at 974-80.
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more appropriate system, however, foreclosure sale prices should
be measured by the Durrett standard of reasonable equivalence
and compared to the price an ideal system would have produced.
V. SECTION 722 REDEMPTION VALUE
A. Mechanics Underlying the Valuation Issue
Section 722 of the Code allows debtors to redeem certain
property from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt.248
The redeemable property must be tangible personalty held for per-
sonal, family, or household use, and the property is redeemable
only if exempted under section 522247 or abandoned under section
544 .24 The legislative history describes redemption as a "right of
first refusal for the debtor in consumer goods that might otherwise
be repossessed. ' 249 The right of redemption, by giving the debtor a
fresh start after declaring bankruptcy and surrendering property,
supports the same policy as the exemption provision. 250 A debtor
can use postpetition earnings or exemption proceeds to purchase,
for the amount of the claim, any necessary items held by the
lienholder and, thus, avoid a possible high replacement cost.25 1
From a creditor's perspective, section 722 merely places the credi-
tor in the same position as if the creditor had repossessed and sold
the property.
252
246. Section 722 provides:
An individual debtor may... redeem tangible personal property intended primarily
for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer
debt, if such property is exempted under section 522 of this title or has been aban-
doned under section 554 of this title by paying the holder of such lien the amount of
the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien.
11 U.S.C. § 722 (1982).
247. Id.; see supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text (describing exempt items and
the mechanics of § 522). Section 722 redemptions do not overlap Section 522 exemptions
because under § 522 a debtor may exempt only non-possessory, nonpurchase money security
interests, whereas under § 722 a debtor may redeem from a purchase money security inter-
est as well as a nonpurchase money security interest. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
722.01, at 722-3 (15th ed. 1985).
248. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1982). Section 554 allows abandonment when the property is
inconsequential or burdensome to the estate. Id. § 554(a)-(b). Property also is abandoned by
operation of law if it is not administered by the closing of the case. Id. § 554(c).
249. H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 380-81, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6336-37.
250. See Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 541 (1885).
251. See id.; H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 380-81, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6336-37; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 722.01, at 722-2
(15th ed. 1985).
252. See In re Pierce, 5 Bankr. 346, 347 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980).
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Valuation becomes an issue under section 722 because a
debtor may redeem property from a creditor's lien by paying the
creditor the value of the property upon which the creditor has an
allowed, secured claim. 53 Section 506(a) provides that an allowed
claim is a claim secured to the extent of the value of the creditor's
collateral. 54 Theoretically, a debtor could redeem property for less
than the original obligation2 55 because the secured portion of the
claim is limited to the value of the property. Therefore, debtors
will argue for a low value, which allows them to redeem their prop-
erty more easily, while creditors will argue for a high value, which
allows them to recoup a larger portion of the original obligation.25 6
Section 722 contains no language offering guidance on the ap-
propriate standard or method of valuation. 57 Section 506(a), how-
ever, addresses the valuation issue with the purpose of determining
the extent to which a claim is secured. Section 506(a) and its legis-
lative history permit an examination into the purpose of the valua-
tion or the proposed use or disposition of the property and indicate
that valuations can vary with the circumstances from case to
case.258 Section 722 does not state expressly that section 506(a)
should control the valuation issue; section 506(a), however, is nec-
essary to determine the extent to which a claim is secured for pur-
poses of section 722.59
Section 722's legislative history addresses value only to indi-
cate that when a debtor deliberately allows the property to decline
in value, the debtor must pay the full fair market value of the
property or the amount of the claim, whichever is less.2 60 The legis-
lative history, however, offers no method for determining fair mar-
ket value and does not indicate when fair market value should be
determined, although presumably this determination will occur
sometime prior to when the debtor allowed the depreciation in
value. Thus, the relevant Code language and legislative history
seemingly indicate that when the debtor does not deliberately per-
253. See supra note 246.
254. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
255. See In re Cruseturner, 8 Bankr. 581, 588 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
256. See, e.g., In re Clark, 10 Bankr. 605 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1981); In re Pierce, 5 Bankr.
346 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980).
257. See supra note 246.
258. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (providing text and legislative history
of § 506(a)).
259. See In re Seigler, 5 Bankr. 12, 13 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
260. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 95, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5881.
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mit a decline in value, a court may accept something less than fair
market value as the redemption value.
B. Inconsistent Judicial Terminology and Approaches
Judicial response to section 722 valuation lacks consistency,
with courts adopting a number of different valuation labels, rang-
ing from lien redemption value,26' wholesale value, 262 replacement
value,2 63 and fair market value264 to open market value.26 5 Unfortu-
nately, the lack of consistency in terminology also leads to incon-
sistent conceptual approaches. Different courts have applied com-
pletely different methods and theories of valuation to almost
identical fact patterns.
In In re Siegler2 6  the/United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Minnesota idehtified the appropriate value as "lien re-
demption value" and noted two separate definitions that, accord-
ing to the court, would lead to identical valuations.267 The first def-
inition identifies the appropriate value as the amount the creditor
could apply to the debt after a deliberate sale of the debtor's prop-
erty, reduced by costs incident to that sale.2 68 This valuation
method recognizes that the sale price reflects creditors' different
abilities to invest time and effort in a sale.2 9 The second definition
of "lien redemption value" is the amount that the debtor would
have to pay a willing seller who is in a position similar to that of
the creditor.17 0 The court found the two definitions to be identical
and, without explanation, stated that the definitions recognize the
reasonable expectations of the parties.27
After receiving testimony on liquidation value, loan value,
261. In re Seigler, 5 Bankr. 12 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
262. In re Pierce, 5 Bankr. 346 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980).
263. In re McQuinn, 6 Bankr. 899 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980).
264. In re Kinser, 17 Bankr. 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
265. In re Klien, 20 Bankr. 493 (N.D. IlM. 1982).
266. 5 Bankr. 12 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
267. Id. at 13-14.
268. Id. at 13. Costs incident to a final sale include foreclosure expenses and any re-
pair expenses necessary to improve the property for sale. Id.
269. Id. Some creditors will sell on the retail market, while others will sell on the
wholesale market. Id. In Siegler the court felt that the creditor was in a position to put
more time, money, and patience into the sale and, thus, reap a higher price than most se-
cured creditors such as banks or finance companies. Id.
270. Id. at 13-14.
271. Id. at 14. The court stated, "[T]hese two values are identical. They are not loan,
retail, wholesale, liquidation, fair market or even replacement values. They do recognize the
reasonable expectancies of debtors and creditors under 11 U.S.C. ]§ 50]6 and 722. They may
therefore be termed together as the lien redemption value." Id.
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trade-in value, and retail value, the court conceded that its final
determination necessarily would be speculative because the result
would be a "prediction of the final sale without benefit of a final
sale actually happening. '2 72 The court finally determined the ap-
propriate value to be the loan value plus two-thirds of the differ-
ence between loan value and retail value.27 ' The court erred in
equating the amount a creditor could realize with the amount a
debtor would have to pay because a creditor may not always sell in
the same market from which a debtor buys. Because redeemable
property is personal in nature, the debtor likely will purchase in a
retail market, yet, unless the creditor happens to be a retailer, the
creditor likely will sell in a market resembling wholesale.
Other courts make strong arguments for allowing the debtor to
redeem its property at wholesale value.274 Wholesale valuation ap-
plies to a creditor who cannot expect to receive more than a whole-
sale price upon foreclosure of the lien and sale of the property.2 75 A
creditor cannot expect more than a wholesale price in two circum-
stances. First, when a creditor is not in the business of selling the
type of property in question on the retail market, the creditor ei-
ther must sell to a dealer at wholesale or auction the property for
perhaps even less.21 e Second, when the property sought to be re-
deemed is of a nature such that a retail market does not exist for
that property, wholesale value also is appropriate.2 " From a
debtor's perspective, wholesale value provides a less formidable re-
demption price and supports the section 722 policy of allowing the
debtor to redeem its essential household items. 8 Wholesale value
also comports with the creditor's expectation interest because if
272. Id.
273. The court chose two-thirds rather than the normal percentage of one-half because
of the nature of the creditor. Id.
274. See, e.g., In re Redding, 34 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983); In re Clark, 10
Bankr. 605 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1981); In re Pierce, 5 Bankr. 346 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980).
275. See, e.g., Redding, 34 Bankr. at 973; Pierce, 5 Bankr. at 347.
276. See Redding, 34 Bankr. at 973. The Redding court stated:
In this case, we think that all SCDC can hope to recover is the wholesale value of the
debtors' motor vehicle. As a practical matter, SCDC is not in the business of selling
used cars. If the debtors' vehicle was returned to SCDC, its most likely disposition of
the vehicle would be at auction or through resale by a dealer. While the value of the
vehicle to the debtors undoubtedly exceeds its forced sale value, we find that the fair
market value of the debtors' vehicle to be the wholesale value of $1,900. The equities
are well balanced by this determination because SCDC receives the value it could best
hope to achieve and the debtors' fresh start is facilitated by the lower valuation.
Id.
277. See Pierce, 5 Bankr. at 347.
278. See Redding, 34 Bankr. at 973.
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the property lacks retail value, the creditor could hope to receive
no more than wholesale value. 9 Creditors, however, are not al-
ways limited to a wholesale market and, thus, under the contextual
approach of section 506(a), creditors should be allowed to argue
that they have access to a retail market.
At least one court has attempted to utilize the term "replace-
ment value" as the proper standard under section 722 .21 The
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska, in In
re McQuihn, recognized section 506(a) as controlling2" and then
determined that because section 722 "amounts to a right of first
refusal," the debtor should be forced to pay the replacement value
of the collateral-the retail price.28 2 Finally, the court decided that
the retail value should be reduced by the amount of dealer over-
head, salesman's commissions, and dealer profit.283 These last ad-
justments essentially converted replacement value into wholesale
value.28 4
McQuinn represents a poor analysis for two reasons. First, the
proper focus should be on the amount recoverable by the creditor
upon exercise of the lien and sale of the property, not upon the
amount the debtor would have to pay elsewhere absent the re-
demption right. The court did not explore in what market the
creditor might sell. If the debtor is required to pay the same price
regardless of whether the property is acquired by redemption from
the creditor or by purchase from a dealer, section 722 would offer
no benefit to the debtor. To solve this conceptual problem, the
court reduced the price for certain dealer costs. Second, the court
assumes that the retail market is the debtor's proper replacement
market. Considering the debtor's postbankruptcy position, the
debtor likely would explore the second-hand market, not the retail
market, for a replacement.
Some courts have required the debtor to pay full fair market
value regardless of whether the creditor is a retailer 25 or a nonre-
taller.286 These decisions are mostly conclusory, lacking developed
reasoning or justification for using fair market value instead of
279. Id.
280. In re McQuinn, 6 Bankr. 899 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980).
281. Id. at 900.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Redding, 34 Bankr. at 973.
285. In re Kinser, 17 Bankr. 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
286. In re Davis, 15 Bankr. 118 (Bankr. C.D. InI. 1981).
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other methods of valuation.2 17 Courts holding that redemption
value is equivalent to fair market value often do not recognize
amounts provided for in repurchase contracts.288 When acting as a
financier, the creditor often is a party to a repurchase contract
with the retailer and will argue that redemption value is the
amount stipulated in the contract.89 Courts consistently have dis-
regarded these repurchase contracts.2 9 0 Repurchase contracts are
viewed as creating a "mythical market" to increase artificially the
redemption value291 without any relation to a rational method of
valuation. 2  Courts also note that repurchase contracts conflict
with the congressional goal of providing a debtor with the right of
redemption without a high replacement cost.
29 3
C. Creditor Expectations and Debtor Redemption
Although the Siegler294 opinion is somewhat convoluted in its
analysis and application of what the court termed "lien redemp-
tion value," the court struck upon one element deserving applica-
tion in all redemption valuation cases. That element is the first of
the court's two definitions of "lien redemption value," which is the
amount a creditor could apply to its debt after deliberately selling
the property.29 5 This valuation method supports both of the follow-
ing primary objectives of section 722: (1) to provide the debtor
with a right of first refusal;2 96 and (2) to keep the creditor in the
same position as if the creditor repossessed and sold the
property.
297
The next problem is determining what the creditor would re-
ceive if it repossessed and sold the property. The wholesale value
cases offer good analysis because they examine the nature of the
287. See, e.g., In re Shweitzer, 19 Bankr. 860, 862 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982) (allowing a
debtor to redeem his property "by paying the holder of the lien the amount of its allowed
secured claim, i.e., its fair market value"); Kinser, 17 Bankr. at 469 (stating that "any re-
demption of property . . . pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 722 must be at fair market value");
Davis, 15 Bankr. at 119 (finding the redemption value to be the fair market value).
288. In re Davis, 15 Bankr. 118 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1981).
289. Id. at 119.
290. In re Cooper, 7 Bankr. 537, 539 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
291. In re Klien, 20 Bankr. 493, 495 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1982).
292. Id. at 495.
293. Cruseturner, 8 Bankr. at 585.
294. 5 Bankr. 12 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
295. Id. at 14.
296. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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creditor and the property, 29 8 precisely the approach recommended
by section 506(a).2 9 The cases seem to indicate that few debtor
entities or redeemable items warrant full retail value. Although not
cited by any cases deciding the valuation issue, The Report of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (the
Commission Report) adopts a position in full accord with the first
part of the Siegler test.300 The Commission Report stated that
"fair market value" would be "the net amount the creditor would
receive were he to repossess the collateral and dispose of it as per-
mitted by the applicable nonbankruptcy law."30' This approach
necessarily requires inquiring into the creditor's method of sale
and into the market available for the type of property subject to
the lien. An examination of many of the section 722 cases on the
basis of these two factors would lead to the conclusion that whole-
sale value would be the appropriate valuation method under many
circumstances. Therefore, Congress should adopt a presumption in
favor of wholesale value for section 722 valuation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Each Code section examined by this Note requires an inde-
pendent valuation of debtor property and, accordingly, applies dif-
ferent standards to comport with competing legislative objectives
and policies. Section 522 specifically requires that property be val-
ued at "fair market value" when determining whether a debtor as-
set is fully or partially exempt.02 Section 547 values debtor assets
at "a fair valuation" to determine debtor solvency303 and also val-
ues debtor assets under the contextual approach of section 506(a)
to determine if a creditor, because its claim was only partially se-
cured, received a greater amount than it otherwise would have re-
ceived upon liquidation.0 4 Section 548 values debtor assets under
a "reasonably equivalent" standard to determine whether a debtor
defrauded creditors by executing a prefiling transfer for insuffi-
cient consideration.3 0 5 Finally, section 722 values debtor assets
under the contextual approach of section 506(a) to determine the
298. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
300. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 131 (1973).
301. Id.
302. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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extent to which a creditor's claim is secured so that the debtor can
redeem the property for that amount."' Because these sections are
the result of distinct historical developments and achieve different
purposes, any attempt to standardize a method of valuation would
cause further confusion and uncertainty. Each section, however,
should not operate to surprise unwary litigants with a new ap-
proach for each case. Naturally, each case will differ, but the ap-
proach to valuation should be consistent within each Code section.
Courts have interpreted the section 522 statutory language of
"fair market value" to mean two possible standards of valuation.0
Walsh articulates the standard as meaning liquidation value be-
cause section 522 operates in a liquidation context and because
even if the creditor were to repossess and sell the debtor's prop-
erty, the price would be at liquidation.308 Nellis interprets the
standard as the ordinary and traditional meaning of "fair market
value," the market between willing buyers and sellers.309 Courts
have interpreted a seemingly clear definition differently because,
upon close examination, "fair market value" does not specify
which market is to be considered in the valuation determination.
Congress should reexamine the standard of value most appropriate
under 522 and adopt a standard that will allow liquidation value.
This standard alone enhances redemption policies without harming
creditor expectations.
The valuation standard for determining debtor solvency under
section 547 enjoys a consistently applied definition.310 That defini-
tion, however, lacks clarity because it contemplates a hypothetical
market somewhere between ordinary full fair market value and liq-
uidation value. To foster consistency and predictability, courts
should examine the nature of each asset and determine the highest
value realizable by the debtor at the time of the alleged preferen-
tial transfer. Additionally, although courts are just beginning to
recognize the valuation issue inherent in the "greater amount re-
ceived" requirement,31 1 valuation for purposes of the "insolvency"
requirement should serve as a guide to preserve consistency within
the Code section.
Section 548 presents the strongest calling for congressional ac-
306. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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tion. Two circuits hold that a properly conducted foreclosure sale
is conclusively presumed to produce a "reasonably equivalent
value."3 12 Two other circuits hold that any foreclosure sale should
be scrutinized for insufficient consideration.3 13 The resolution of
these conflicting views requires a congressional position on the pol-
icy issue of whether section 548 implants a federal standard on
state foreclosure laws. 14
Section 722 is subject to the widest variety of interpretations,
which is perhaps tolerable because section 722 calls for the contex-
tual approach to valuation under section 506(a). 15 In most cases
the creditor's expectation interest is wholesale value, a value that
also enhances the debtor's redemption possibilities. Accordingly,
Congress should consider a presumption in favor of wholesale
value. Congress, however, should allow an inquiry into the circum-
stances of each case to determine whether a different valuation
standard for that particular case would be more appropriate.
Steven L. Pottle
312. See supra notes 202-15 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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